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MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, R & E

SUBJECT: Functions of the "Global Survey Group."

Reference: Memorandum for the Director, "Organization of the Office of Reports and Estimates," 3 July 1947.

1. The Reference defines the functions of the proposed "Global Survey Group" in general terms, as follows:

Constantly studies all pertinent intelligence for the express purpose of promptly detecting and bringing into focus world developments affecting the national security with special emphasis upon the strategic implications of multinational situations. Produces the World Situation Estimate.

2. The essence of this concept is that the Group should be composed of a few carefully selected men of broad intelligence experience (rather than particular specialization) and of proved insight, who, being relieved of routine operational responsibilities, have the freedom (inevitably denied to all chiefs of operational units) to ponder the broader aspects and less obvious implications of the developing international situation, to consult the most expert opinion with respect to trends thus perceived, to effect the ultimate correlation and synthesis, and to give appropriate guidance to the staffs and branches concerned.

3. This concept is not new, but previous attempts to implement it have fallen short of the mark - e.g., the "Twelve Apostles" in G-2 and, later, the "Specialists." The first of these experiments failed because the "Apostles" were too far removed from the everyday work of M.I.S. and became eventually no more than odd-job handymen for the A.C. of S., G-2. The second failed because the "Specialists," individually, were too narrowly specialized and temperamentally unable to keep free of the day to day business of M.I.S. Manifestly, very nice discrimination and judgment is required to maintain desirable detachment midway between the self-defeating extremes of involvement and isolation. The relationships which should exist between the G.S.G. and the operating staffs and branches of O.R.E. therefore require thoughtful consideration, although they should not be too rigidly prescribed in advance.

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4. As a corollary of its broad surveillance of the developing situation, which will be accomplished in large part through thoughtful scrutiny of the intelligence produced by C.I.G. and the Departmental agencies, the G.S.G. should not only advise the staffs and branches of O.R.E. regarding the broader implications of regional and functional developments, but should also guide the intelligence production program, indicating requirements for Daily and Weekly coverage, for estimates in the O.R.E. series, etc. Moreover, the G.S.G. will have occasion to initiate O.R.E. (and perhaps Departmental) intelligence studies preliminary to its preparation of the World Situation Report. This function resembles the overall coordination and supervision formerly vested in the Intelligence Staff, but must be distinguished from the executive responsibilities inherited from the I.S. by the three successor staffs, formerly I.S. divisions. For many reasons it would seem desirable that this function be accomplished, not by formal paperwork, but by informal consultation and discussion with the staff and branch chiefs concerned in each case.

5. The chiefs of the Current Intelligence and Estimates Staffs will inevitably turn to the G.S.G. for guidance which they have hitherto received from the Intelligence Staff. It is proper that they should consult the G.S.G. regarding the broader aspects and deeper implications of particular reports and estimates, and the G.S.G. should be located near them in order to facilitate such consultation. All concerned, however, must be on guard lest the G.S.G. be diverted from its function much as Dr. VanSlyck was drawn into the day to day operations of the Current Division, I.S.

6. The Chief and Deputy Chief of the Intelligence Staff have customarily conducted the Tuesday afternoon oral presentation and a preliminary Monday afternoon meeting in O.R.E. In the sense that this is a routine process resulting in the presentation of current intelligence, the function may be considered to devolve upon the Current Intelligence Staff. In the sense that it is, at least potentially, a means whereby the branch chiefs may be brought periodically to consider the global significance of developments in their respective jurisdictions, it is a proper function of the G.S.G. On balance, I would recommend that the G.S.G. be charged with coordinating and conducting the Tuesday presentation, for the express purpose of developing the preliminary discussion as indicated above and the presentation itself as a review of the global significance of current events rather than a miscellany of local developments.

7. At least for the time being, the recruiting objective for the G.S.G. should include no more than five P-3's and a corresponding clerical staff. The professional personnel should include a chief

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(as primus inter pares, for administrative convenience) and four associates, all chosen primarily for personal qualifications indicated in paragraph 2, but with incidental regard for a balanced representation of the interests of the I.A.B. agencies or of appropriate disciplines (history, political science, economics, sociology). Recruitment should be sure rather than hasty or expedient, preferably by selection after probationary service elsewhere in O.R.E. As the Group develops it should acquire a junior professional secretary to function as did the Secretary, Joint Intelligence Staff, but such assistance is not an immediate requirement. The maximum strength presently foreseeable would thus be, in tabular form:

Chief	P-8	1
Associates	P-8	4
Secretary	P-3/P-1	1
Secretary to Chief	CAF-5	1
Clerk-Stenographers	CAF-3	4
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It must be reiterated that this strength should be regarded as an ultimate maximum, not likely to be attained in this fiscal year if proper care is observed in recruitment.

LUDWELL L. MONTAGUE
Chief, Intelligence Staff, ORE

cc: Chief, Planning Staff
Chief, Executive Staff
Dr. VanSlyck
Current Division
Projects Division